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Hidetaka Yakura provides an interesting contribution to the discussion on minimal cognition. He develops the idea that
the CRISPR/Cas immune system, as present in many bacteria and archaea, can itself be cast as a minimal cognitive
system.
Keywords
minimal cognition, CRISPR/Cas, immune system
Handling Editor: Martin Hanczyc, Universita` degli Studi di Trento, Italy
Hidetaka Yakura (2019) provides an interesting contri-
bution to the discussion on minimal cognition. He
develops the idea that the CRISPR/Cas immune sys-
tem, as present in many bacteria and archaea, can itself
be cast as a minimal cognitive system: immune systems
exhibit fundamental cognitive features such as recogni-
tion, information integration, responses to external
threats, and memory. In addition, he extrapolates from
here to the cognitive importance of all immunological
systems. In this way, Yakura presents a convincing case
of minimal cognition that exhibits interesting features
that further extend an already wide range of cases cur-
rently defended as examples of (minimal) cognition.
This list now contains organisms such as bacteria, slime
molds, plants, and a broad range of animals as clear
cases (Barrett, 2011; Godfrey-Smith, 2016; Lyon, 2015)
and also other biological processes such as develop-
ment, regeneration, and physiological functions
(Balusˇka & Levin, 2016; Keijzer, 2017). Yakura’s dis-
cussion of immune systems nicely fits into this pattern.
Having said this, it is less clear how this proposal
impinges on the general issue of formulating minimal
conditions for cognition. Ideally, this would consist of
clear, necessary, and sufficient conditions for designat-
ing a system as cognitive. Yakura claims that existing
proposals are diverse, each making sense in their respec-
tive contexts, but none of them being able to provide a
widely shared consensus view. As a remedy, he posits
that the (bacterial) immune system provides a more
generally useful alternative as it ‘‘serves as a more
universal and fundamental cognitive system in living
beings’’ such that for cognitive capacities, it is ‘‘obliga-
tory to adopt a biochemical definition.’’
Concerning this last point—formulating minimal
conditions for cognition—Yakura overstates his case.
First, while accepting that immune systems suffice as
cases of cognitive systems, making their presence a
requirement for minimal cognition is no improvement
when it comes to demarcating minimal cognition. A
reason for considering immune systems as cases of cog-
nition does itself derive from the use of what Lyon
(2015) calls a cognitive toolbox: a diverse set of criteria
such as the presence of sensing/perception, valence,
behavior, memory, learning, and various others that
provide useful indicators to signal the presence of cog-
nitively relevant phenomena. Importantly, the cognitive
features that Yakura mentions to characterize an
immune system and claim its cognitive status clearly fit
in this toolbox list. At this point, it rather seems that
Yakura provides support for the toolbox list as a useful
and pragmatic way to demarcate cognitive phenomena:
the immune system case provides a new ‘‘minimal’’
example of cognition but not a criterion.
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Second, defining (minimal) cognition in biochemical
terms rather than using something such as Lyon’s tool-
box seems to contradict Yakura’s own critique of the
use of structurally based interpretations of cognition.
Yakura questions taking the brain as a structural
requirement for cognition, a situation that he compares
to the initial problem in immunology of accepting a
CRSPR/Cas-based immune system that worked with-
out the seemingly necessary ingredients of lymphocytes
and antibodies. This critique is valid enough, but it
becomes problematical to align this with a subsequent
‘‘biochemical definition’’ of minimal cognition. Thus,
while Yakura stresses the importance of a functional
interpretation of immune systems, he still returns to a
definition of cognition that highlights a structural view
of the immune system. It is unclear how he would
avoid the very problems he signals when it comes to
taking brains as a requirement for cognition.
This last critical point should be placed in context
however. Yakura’s somewhat equivocal treatment of
functional and structural interpretations of cognition
touches on a key issue concerning the demarcation of
cognition. On one hand, one could argue that a func-
tional reading of minimal cognition suffices and that
the structural aspects—the material system itself—are
not by themselves necessary, as long as a functionality
is maintained that fulfills the toolbox criteria. On the
other hand, this is not a direction that gives sufficient
credit to the CRISPR/Cas case and the lessons that can
be learned from this example.
Immune systems, nervous systems, developmental
systems, and other similar cases do not lie around on
the ground to be found by an attentive human being
who looks down at the right spot. They are components
of various organisms for which they perform a broad
range of functions, functions that depend on and make
sense in this organismal context and that can be pre-
sumed to be deeply entangled with this context in, up
till now, unknown ways. Some of these functions, and
probably much more than we are currently aware of,
fulfill the toolbox criteria that make it plausible to des-
ignate them as cognitive in some new way.
However, discovering these functions as well as deci-
phering how they are performed derives from a study
of the organisms in which they occur and where they
are relevant. Yakura’s CRISPR/Cas example is a case
in point. It was the study of bacteria that provided this
exciting new case of (minimal) cognition, like other
examples that are now explicated in a wide array of liv-
ing systems (Balusˇka & Levin, 2016; Keijzer, 2017;
Lyon, 2015). In all these instances, living systems pro-
vide the structural—material—basis where phenomena
occur that can be studied empirically and sometimes be
deemed (minimally) cognitive.
Looking at cognitive functions in a more abstract
way easily leads to an interpretation of cognition that
is only loosely connected to life. A general lesson to
be drawn from the CRISPR/Cas case, as well as other
such examples, is that the relation between life and
cognition is actually a very close one. The point here
is not to argue that the notions of cognition (or mind)
and life must be joined in an intrinsic conceptual way,
as for example is done in parts of the enactivist litera-
ture (e.g. Thompson, 2007). Instead, the claim is sim-
ply that living systems provide the natural material
examples that exhibit cognitive phenomena, often in
ways that we are little aware of as yet. Thus, instead
of setting abstract cognitive functions center stage, a
better way to understand the broad variety of cogni-
tive phenomena is by studying the living systems that
exhibit them.
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